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1I. Introduction
High wage differences across countries constitute an important explanation for the
currently significant business practice of international outsourcing (see e.g. Sinn
(2007) for an overview and Stefanova (2006) concerning the East-West dichotomy of
outsourcing).1 How  governments  can  control  when  their  countries  are  exposed  to
increasing international integration of their economies? This paper provides some
answers to this question for the case of labour market tax reform in the presence of
outsourcing when domestic labour markets are imperfectly competitive. It is assumed
in this paper that firms are flexible enough to decide upon the amount of outsourcing
activity simultaneously concerning domestic labour demand after the wage rate have
been negotiated by labour unions and firms.
This paper designs a model to answer the following questions: What are the
effects of outsourcing costs, productivity of outsourcing and domestic wage rate on
the wage elasticity of labour demand in the case of flexible outsourcing? What are the
effects of outsourcing costs and substitutability between outsourcing and domestic
labour and wage tax and tax exemption on wage formation in an imperfectly
competitive labour markets when labour unions and firms negotiate wages? Finally,
what are the effects of labour tax reform on domestic wage setting and employment
under flexible outsourcing?2 In this analysis the fully-balanced public sector budget
aspect is not considered, because only some sector may engage outsourcing, but not
the whole economy.
It  is  shown  that  in  the  presence  of  flexible  outsourcing  the  wage  elasticity  of
domestic labour demand is higher  than  in  the  case  of  strategic  outsourcing.  It  is  a
decreasing function of the outsourcing cost, and an increasing function both of the
degree of substitutability between domestic labour and outsourcing and of the wage
rate of domestic labour. With sufficiently strong (weak) labour market imperfections
1       Amiti  and Wei  (2004)  as  well  as  Rishi  and Saxena  (2004)  emphasize  to  the  big  difference  on
labour costs as the main explanation for the strong increase in outsourcing of both
manufacturing and services to countries with low labour costs.
2        This issue have been analyzed in the absence of outsourcing e.g. Koskela and Vilmunen (1996),
and Koskela and Schöb (1999), (2002a), (2002b)
2a lower outsourcing cost has a wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect. With a
monopoly labour union, a lower outsourcing cost moderates wages and in the absence
of labour market imperfections there is no relationship between outsourcing cost and
wage formation. In the presence of flexible outsourcing the wage tax has a positive
effect and the tax exemption a negative effect on wage negotiation. In the presence of
flexible outsourcing increasing the degree of tax progression under Nash wage
bargaining, to keep the relative tax burden per worker constant, has a wage-
moderating effect and a positive effect of domestic employment and a negative effect
on outsourcing. In this case qualitative results on wage formation and dometstic
employment are similar in the absence of outsourcing.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents the basic structure of
theoretical framework as well as time sequence of decisions in terms of wage
formation, outsourcing and domestic labour demand. Domestic labour demand and
outsourcing are studied in section III, whereas the focus on wage determination
through Nash bargaining in the presence of linearly progressive wage tax is in section
IV. The effects of labour tax progression on domestic wage setting and employment
are analyzed in section V. Finally, conclusions are presented in section VI.
II. Basic Framework
In this paper the focus is to study the effects of wage tax policy on wage negotiation
and domestic labour demand when outsourcing is flexible to decide simultaneously
both domestic labour demand and outsourcing after the wage negotiation is set by the
labour union and the firm. The time sequence is described in Figure 1.
  stage 1                stage 2                   stage 3
                                                                                            time
        tax policy           wage setting       domestic labour demand
                                                              and outsourcing
Figure 1: Time sequence of decisions
3At stage 1 the government behaves as a Stackelberg leader and fixes two labour
tax parameters. To raise revenues the government can employ a wage tax t , which is
levied on the wage w , minus a tax exemption a .  The  tax  base  per  worker  for  the
wage tax t  equals )( aw? .  In  the  presence  of  a  positive  tax  exemption a , the
marginal tax rate t  exceeds the average tax rate )/1( wat ? so that the tax system is
linearly progressive.3 The net-of-tax wage, the worker receives, is given by
.)1( tawtwwn ???
At stage 2 the labour union and the firm negotiate wage formation using the
Nash bargaining approach by taking tax parameters as given and anticipating the
consequences that wage setting will have for the domestic labour demand and
outsourcing.
At stage 3 both the domestic labour demand and outsourcing is decided
simultaneously by the firm by taking tax parameters and wage setting as given.
Skaksen (2004) has analyzed this timing structure in the absence of labour taxation by
assuming the firms could decide outsourcing after the determination of domestic
wage. Also Brown and Scheffel (2007) have developed in the absence of labour
taxation  a simple two-stage game between a monopoly union and a firm by assuming
that the union sets wages before the firm decides on the degree of outsourcing and the
level of production.
To derive an explicit solution a decreasing returns to scale production function
is presented as
? ? ? ? ????
? 1
1
,
?
??? MLMLR , 1??                                 (1)
where L  is the amount of labour employed in-house and M denotes the firm’s labour
input acquired from external suppliers through outsourcing. The parameter 0??
captures the productivity of outsourcing relative to the domestic labour input. In the
case of perfect substitutability we have 1?? .
3      For a seminal paper about tax progression, see Musgrave and Thin (1948), and for another
elaboration, see e.g. Lambert (2001, chapters 7-8).
4The analysis starts with an investigation of domestic labour demand and
outsourcing and in the subsequent sections it is characterized wage bargaining and tax
policies by applying backward induction.
III. Domestic Labour Demand and Outsourcing
In the case of flexible outsourcing the firm decides simultaneously on domestic
in-house employment L  and outsourcing M , where the costs of outsourcing are
convex,  so  as  to  maximize  the  profit  function  when  the  price  of  the  output  good  is
normalized to unity
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by taking both the negotiated wage and the cost of outsourcing as given. The first-
order conditions are
? ? 01 ???? ? wMLL ??? ,                                                 (3a)
? ? 01 ???? ? cMMLM ??? ? .                                           (3b)
These give the following domestic labour demand and outsourcing
c
wwMwL 2?? ?? ???? ?? ,                                             (4a)
c
wM ?? .                                                                            (4b)
Domestic labour demand is a negative function of the wage rate and the productivity
of outsourcing, and a positive function of the cost of outsourcing, while outsourcing is
a positive function of wage rate and productivity of outsourcing and a negative
5function of the cost of outsourcing. This means that higher outsourcing will decrease
domestic labour demand.4
The wage elasticity of labour demand under flexible outsourcing, which turns
out to be important later on, can be expressed as
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The wage elasticity of labour demand is higher than in the case of strategic
outsourcing when outsourcing is determined by firms before wage negotiation, i.e.
)1( *L
Msf ???? ???  (= the wage elasticity of labour demand under strategic
outsourcing5), and it depends on parameters ?  and w  as well as the cost of
outsourcing c  via the  share of outsourced production ./ LM  The outsourcing
elasticities are constant and equal to one, i.e. 1????
M
cM
M
M
M
wM cw ?? . The
relationship between the wage rate and the wage elasticity of domestic labour demand
is positive
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and the relationship between the outsourcing cost and the wage elasticity of domestic
labour demand is negative
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4         See e.g. Görg and Hanley (2005) and Hijzen et al. (2005) for evidence based on various data
sets.
5        This case has been analyzed in Koskela and Stenbacka (2008) by studying the impact of
strategic outsourcing on equilibrium unemployment.
6According to this higher outsourcing due to lower outsourcing cost will increase the
wage elasticity of domestic labour demand, which lies in conformity with empirical
evidence from various data sets (see e.g. Slaughter (2001), Senses (2006) and Hasan
et al. (2007)). Also the wage elasticity depends positively on the productivity of
outsourcing, i.e.
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These results can be presented in
Proposition 1: In the presence of flexible outsourcing
(a) the wage elasticity of domestic labour demand is higher than in the case
of strategic outsourcing and
(b) it is a decreasing function of the outsourcing cost, an increasing
function both of the productivity of outsourcing and the wage rate of
domestic labour.
IV. Wage Determination via Nash Bargaining under Linearly
Progressive Wage Tax
We now proceed to investigate wage determination by applying the Nash
bargaining solution following the right-to-manage (RTM) approach so that wage
negotiation takes place in anticipation of optimal labour and outsourcing decisions by
the firm (see e.g. Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), chapter 7). In the presence of a
positive tax exemption the marginal tax rate exceeds the average tax rate
)/1( wat ? and the net-of-tax wage is tatw ?? )1( . The labour union’s objective
function in the presence of linearly progressive wage taxation is assumed to be
)())1((ˆ ** LNbLtatwU ????? , where the tax base for the wage tax t  equa1s
7*)( Law? , and *L  denotes the total domestic employment and there is a positive tax
exemption a . b  is the (exogenous) outside option available to union members and
N is the number of union members ( )*LN ?  and the threat point is NbU o ?  so that
the relevant target function of the labour union is ))1((ˆ * btatwLNbUU ?????? .
The indirect profit function by substituting the optimal domestic labour demand
(4a) and the optimal outsourcing (4b) into the profit function (2) can be written after
the calculations as follows:
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Following the Nash bargaining approach the firm and the labour union negotiate
with respect to wage rate so as to solve the following optimization problem
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               s.t.
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where the relative bargaining power of the labour union is ?  and that of the firm is
??1 .  The first-order condition for the negotiated wage rate can be written as
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(see Appendix A concerning (11b)).
8Substituting (11a) and (11b) into the first-order condition (10) gives the
following Nash bargaining solution for the negotiated wage (see Appendix A)
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It is important to mention that equation (12) is not an explicit form for the wage
rate under outsourcing because the mark-up both in terms of the numerator and the
denominator also depends in a non-linear way on the wage ratio via the ratio between
outsourcing and domestic labour demand (see equation (4a)). According to (12) the
negotiated wage rate depends positively on bˆ  and the relative bargaining power of
the labour union, and negatively on the wage elasticity of domestic labour demand. In
the case of the monopoly labour union under outsourcing we have the following
implicit form
bbwN ˆ
)1(
ˆ
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)2(
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In the absence of outsourcing the Nash bargaining solution (12) for the wage rate is
explicit, i.e. bw
M
N ˆ
)1(
1
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??  as well as in the case of monopoly labour union, i.e.
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9By differentiating the negotiated wage (12) with respect to the outsourcing cost
c  gives (see Appendix B)
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The mark-up will decrease in the lower outsourcing cost if the relative bargaining
powers of labour union is higher than the low threshold determined in (15b). This
threshold is inversely related to the wage elasticity. Lower outsourcing cost increases
the wage elasticity of domestic labour demand by decreasing the mark-up. This is the
dominant effect as long as the labour union has a sufficiently strong bargaining
power. Also wage is affected by the negative effect on profit according to (10) and
when the labour union has a sufficiently low bargaining power, higher outsourcing
due to lower outsourcing cost moderates profit reducing effect of a higher wage. In
this case more outsourcing induces an increase in the wage when the bargaining
power lies with the firm to a sufficient degree. 6
Under monopoly union
11 ??? f
f
fA ?
?
?
 so that in this case the lower outsourcing cost
will decrease the mark-up, i.e. 0
)1(1
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cf
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?
?
. In the absence of labour market
imperfections, this effect is zero.
6       This has been analyzed in Koskela and Stenbacka (2008) in the presence of strategic
outsourcing.
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This result can be summarized in.
Proposition 2: With sufficiently strong (weak) labour market imperfections
a lower outsourcing cost has a wage-moderating (wage-increasing) effect.
With a monopoly labour union, a lower outsourcing cost moderates wages
and in the absence of labour market imperfections there is no relationship
between outsourcing cost and wage formation.
In terms of the wage tax and the tax exemption differentiating (12) gives
0
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so that in the presence of flexible outsourcing wage tax has a positive effect and tax
exemption a negative effect of wage negotiation.
V. Effects of Labour Tax Progression on Wage Negotiation and
Employment
Now  the  analysis  concentrates  on  the  effects  of  tax  progression  for  wage
negotiation and employment by looking as tax reform that increases tax progression
while keeping the average tax burden per worker constant, i.e. that
at
w
tat ?? (17)
11
is constant. The average tax rate progression ( ARP ) is given by the difference
between the marginal tax rate t  and the average tax rate at , attARP ?? . The tax
system is progressive if ARP  is positive and tax progression is increased if the
difference increases. Government can raise the degree of tax progression when it
increases t  and adjusts a  upwards such that at  remains constant. In this analysis the
fully-balanced public sector budget aspect is not considered, because only some sector
may engage outsourcing, but not the whole economy.
First the analysis focuses the wage effect of this tax reform under Nash domestic
wage bargaining between the labour union and the firm.
Differentiating  (17)  with  respect  to t , a  and w  to keep it constant gives
dw
w
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t
awda ??? )(  and the total wage effect is dawdtwdw at ?? . Substituting
the RHS of dw
w
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so that 0
0
?
?adt
N
dt
dw . A higher degree of tax progression under Nash wage
bargaining, keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant, will decrease the
wage rate in the presence of flexible outsourcing. This also happens in the absence of
outsourcing. The employment and outsourcing effects of this tax reform is by using
equations (4a), (4b) and (18) are
12
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dwL
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dL                                                               (20a)
0
0
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?? aa dt
N
w
dt dt
dwM
dt
dM                                                            (20b)
The wage moderating effect of tax progression, to keep the relative tax burden per
worker constant, increases domestic labour demand and decreases outsourcing in the
presence of flexible outsourcing. This also happens in the absence of outsourcing,
which has been analyzed in the earlier literature, which has been mentioned in
introduction.
These results can be summarized in.
Proposition 3: In the presence of flexible outsourcing increasing the degree
of tax progression under Nash wage bargaining, to keep the relative tax
burden per worker constant, has
(a) a wage-moderating effect, a positive domestic employment and a
negative effect on outsourcing, and
(b) qualitative results on wage formation and domestic employment are
similar in the absence of outsourcing.
VI.  Conclusions
This paper has presented: What are the effects of outsourcing costs, productivity
of outsourcing and domestic labour and domestic wage rate on the wage elasticity of
labour demand in the case of flexible outsourcing? What are the effects of
outsourcing costs and substitutability between outsourcing and domestic labour and
wage tax and tax exemption on wage formation in an imperfectly competitive labour
markets when labour unions and firms negotiate wages? What are the effects of
labour tax reform on domestic wage setting and domestic employment as well as on
outsourcing under flexible outsourcing.
13
It has been shown that in the presence of flexible outsourcing the wage elasticity
of domestic labour demand is higher than in the case of strategic outsourcing and a
decreasing function of the outsourcing cost, and an increasing function both of the
productivity of outsourcing and the wage rate of domestic labour. With sufficiently
strong (weak) labour market imperfections a lower outsourcing cost has a wage-
moderating (wage-increasing) effect. In the presence of flexible outsourcing wage tax
has a positive effect and tax exemption a negative effect of wage negotiation. In the
presence of flexible outsourcing increasing the degree of tax progression under Nash
wage bargaining, to keep the relative tax burden per worker constant, has a wage-
moderating effect and a positive effect of domestic employment and a negative effect
on  outsourcing.  In  this  case  qualitative  results  on  wage  formation  and  domestic
employment are similar in the absence of outsourcing.
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Appendix A: Nash bargaining solution
Taking labour demand (4a) and outsourcing (4b) into account we find that
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which gives (11b). Substituting (11a) and (11b) into the first-order condition (10)
gives
? ? )1(2))()1()(1()2()()1)(1( ???????????? ???????? tabtwtabtw fff    (A2)
and its solution implies the Nash bargaining solution (12). QED.
Appendix B:
By implicit differentiation of (12) with respect to the wage rate and outsourcing cost
gives
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By using 0
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The effect of outsourcing cost on the mark-up under Nash wage bargaining depends
on the relative bargaining power of the labour union as
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Differentiating the mark-up with respect to the wage gives by using 0
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so that the effect of the wage rate on the mark-up is
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By using (B3) and (B5) the equation (B1) can be expressed as follows
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where the denominator is positive so that we have the conclusion
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